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"We will maintain a clear separation of objectives between the macro-prudential policy framework
and monetary policy and a clear hierarchy, with price stability remaining the ECBs overall primary
objective. But we are very much aware that both policies may interact (...) Many of these questions are
yet to be fully explored and we have to acknowledge that the macro-prudential policy framework is still in
its infancy. We are in a learning process (...) Overall, I am optimistic that macro-prudential policies, if
properly coordinated at the European level, will strengthen our defences against future nancial instability
in the euro area, while also addressing some of the side e¤ects that come from a single monetary policy."
Speech by Mario Draghi, at the Symposium on Financial Stability and the Role of Central Banks, 27
February 2014
1 Introduction
Lithuania, as a new member of the euro area, has to implement its macroprudential policies in the
context of this new economic setting, by interacting with the other monetary union members, that
indeed share the same monetary policy. The Bank of Lithuania pursues macroprudential policy at the
national level and monitors, assesses, and acts to limit the macroprudential risk for the stability of
the domestic nancial system; in doing so, it has the possibility to cooperate with the ECB and other
national and international institutions.
Macroprudential implementation is particularly relevant in the context of monetary unions, espe-
cially if they are non-optimal monetary areas like the euro area. There is good evidence that both
business and nancial cycles are not perfectly synchronized among members and that there are impor-
tant cross-country structural di¤erences.1 For instance, there are some particularities in the Lithuanian
housing markets that make it di¤erent from its euro area partners. One of these di¤erences regards
mortgage contracts. Housing loans (and loans to non-nancial corporations, NFCs) in Lithuania are
almost exclusively made at variable interest rates (which are set for xed periods, e.g. of up to 1 year),
which are quick to respond to changes in borrowing costs in the nancial markets.2 In the beginning of
2013, about 70 per cent of new loans to households were issued at exible interest rates. In 2014 and
2015, the proportion increased to more than 80 per cent (in 2015 the share of exible rate loans, for both
1See for instance Comunale and Hessel (2014), for an analysis of nancial and business cycles in the euro area. See
Comunale (2017), for a study on synchronicity of cycles within countries and structural aspects of mortgage markets and
housing in the EU. For an analysis of the cross-country synchronization, see Mink et al. (2012) and Samarina et al. (2015).
2See Karmaziene and Varanauskiene (2014).
2
households and NFCs, reached 90 per cent).3 In the big countries of the euro area, however, the majority
of households take mortgages at a xed rate.4 For France and Germany, the ratio of exible-rate loans is
pretty low, around 12 per cent and 15 per cent respectively, while in Spain it reaches 82 per cent. This
high heterogeneity is reected in an average percentage of variable-rate mortgages in the old members
of the euro area of 45 per cent (the correspective percentage of xed-rate loans is therefore 55 per cent).
The percentage of exible rate loans is even lower if we take into account euro area with 19 members.
Also, the amount of consolidated debt (over GDP) of both households and NFCs is quite heterogeneous
across the euro area. Lithuanians experienced low values in both cases, even if debt levels increased
rapidly in the period 2006-2009, especially for NFCs (83% of GDP at the peak on an average of 64% in
the last decade and 55% in 2015). In Table A.1 in the Appendix, we show these di¤erences in housing
and mortgage markets across the euro area member states.
In this context, the single monetary policy cannot be used to stabilize the economy of a particular
member when it is shocked by an asymmetric disturbance or when the reaction to a common disturbance
is di¤erent due to the structural characteristics of that member state. Therefore, di¤erent countries may
have limited scope to inuence their domestic macroeconomic conditions. The behavior of nancial
cycles and related build-ups of systemic risks often remain local in nature, even if spillovers and global
factors may occur. Thus, macroprudential policy is especially important in a currency union such as
the euro area, given the absence of country-specic monetary policy. In this setting, there would be a
role for the macroprudential policy to complement monetary policy, especially if it is conducted at a
national level. Most of macroprudential tools can have an impact on ination and activity. Thus, it
could happen that macroprudential policies reinforce the monetary policy decisions, but also that they
counteract each other. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the e¤ects of policies across member states.
It is clear now that preventing and mitigating systemic risks to nancial stability has become an
explicit policy objective. However, the stance of macroprudential policy must reect nancial cycles
and structures, which, as already stated, can di¤er markedly across member states. The objectives of
monetary and macroprudential policy are distinct, but may complement each other. The objective of
monetary policy is typically price stability although it may be extended to include nancial stability,
given that price stability cannot be maintained in an unstable nancial system. Equally, nancial
stability, the objective of macroprudential policy, cannot be maintained when ination is out of control.
3Data from the website of the Bank of Lithuania (Statistics).
4See Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2014) on data from ECB. They report the share of exible-rate mortgages among the
oldest active mortgages related to the household main residence.
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Therefore, monetary policy can reinforce nancial stability but it can also have undesirable side e¤ects
on nancial stability. For example, low policy rates, consistent with the pursuit of price stability, may
lead to asset price bubbles that could pose risks to nancial stability. Macroprudential policy can address
such risks with instruments that are more targeted than monetary policy instruments. Ultimately, it is
necessary to nd a policy mix that addresses nancial stability without compromising monetary policy
objectives.
In the European Union (EU), the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is the main body re-
sponsible for monitoring macroprudential policies, although each country can implement its own policy.
That is, macroprudential policies are implemented at a national level, but within a system of central
supervision. However, the ECB could also include among its objectives to safeguard nancial stability.
In this policy framework, it is important to nd the right toolkit of national macroeconomic policies in
a monetary union that, necessarily, applies the same monetary policy among all its members. Thus, it is
necessary to stabilize the nancial cycle and to avoid nancial divergences to arise in the euro area, with-
out compromising real business cycle convergence. Therefore, country specic macroprudential policies
will have an important role to play in the euro area in cooperation with ECB policy.
In this paper, we study these issues taking as an example the case in Lithuania. Now that Lithuania
is part of the euro area, the question is how to correctly implement policies to promote nancial stability,
in accordance with the other members. The economy of Lithuania has su¤ered from the same nancial
stability problems stemming from the crisis as some other countries of the euro area. And it has in
fact fully recovered in terms of economic activity. One of the intermediate objectives that the Bank of
Lithuania has set is to mitigate excessive credit growth and too high leverage.
We aim at illustrating how macroprudential policies could be implemented in Lithuania and in the rest
of the euro area. We propose the implementation of a macroprudential tool, based on the loan-to-value
ratio (LTV)5, that acts countercyclically.6 We compare the e¤ects of this rule with an extended Taylor
rule in which the ECB extends its objectives to also take care of nancial stability. The basic modelling
setup constitutes a two-country new Keynesian DSGE model with nancial frictions. In each country,
5 In our model, the LTV ratio will be calibrated to match the average (market) LTV in steady state. However the market
LTV can vary depending on economic conditions and it may be di¤erent with respect to the imposed LTV cap set by
authority. When the LTV cap is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint in this model is
binding, borrowers will borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore
restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain.
6Here we follow Angelini et al. (2014) in which they assume that the loss function in the economy also contains nancial
variables. Therefore, we use it as a proxy for nancial stability, which is seen as the actual aim of macroprudential policy
(Galati and Moessner, 2011).
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there is a group of individuals that are credit constrained and need housing collateral to obtain loans.
Countries trade goods, and savers in each country have access to foreign assets. Within this setting, we
study the macroeconomic and nancial stability e¤ects of macroprudential policies in Lithuania, in the
context of the euro area. As a macroprudential tool, we propose a decentralized rule for the LTV which
responds to national deviations in credit from its steady state. We also include the common monetary
policy with a Taylor rule, consistent with the ECB target of price stability, with interest-rate smoothing
for interest-rate setting by a single central bank. We then extend the Taylor rule to also respond to
union credit deviations from its steady state.
Results show that in Lithuania, shocks are transmitted in a stronger way given variable rates in
this country, higher mortgage debt and LTVs. However, macroprudential policies are successful at
mitigating the e¤ects on shocks on credit growth. We also nd that both rules are e¤ective in terms of
reducing the volatility of borrowing and therefore in bringing a more stable nancial system, the goal of
macroprudential policies. However, the macroprudential Taylor rule seems to be more e¤ective for this
purpose in both countries. Nevertheless, even though this rule is very e¤ective in reducing the volatility
of credit, it comes with a cost in terms of ination volatility. When using the interest rate as the only
instrument both for monetary and macroprudential policy, there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the
nancial system and keeping prices stable, which should be the primary goal of monetary policy. The
LTV rule, although not as e¤ective as the extended Taylor rule, does not compromise the objective of
monetary policy. This reinforces the so-called "Tinbergen principle," which argues that there should be
two di¤erent instruments when there are two di¤erent policy goals. We conrm the superiority of the
dual regime in terms of welfare, in line with the recent literature (Carrillo et al., 2016).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briey addresses our main contribution, linking it to
the recent literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the parameter values. Section
5 presents the dynamics of the model. Section 6 analyzes the macroeconomic and nancial stability
implications of policies. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review and our Contribution
This paper constitutes a two-country version of the seminal paper of Iacoviello (2005), which introduces a
nancial accelerator that works through the housing sector, in the avor of Aspachs and Rabanal (2010).
However, it introduces cross-country housing-market heterogeneity as in Rubio (2014) or Rubio and
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Comunale (2017). This paper is also related to the recent literature on macroprudential and monetary
policies in Iacoviello-type models such in the aforementioned Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2012) or
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2013, 2014). However, it explores the issue in a two-country setting as in
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015).
Our paper contributes to this literature by looking at a two-country DSGE, modelled for Lithuania
and the euro area, in which we analyze whether the monetary policy rule should respond to nancial
instability as well, or there should be instead a separate rule to deal with the latter one. To answer
our research question, we provide a regular Taylor rule, as the pre-crisis policy setting, an extended
Taylor rule in which the central bank takes care of both macroeconomic stability and nancial stability
(dened as the standard deviation of credit), and a case in which we have both a regular Taylor rule
and a rule for macroprudential actions, based on LTV ratios reacting to borrowing. We believe this
issue is crucial, especially in the context of the euro area and its member states, here represented by
Lithuania as a small open economy with specic characteristics of the housing market, which makes it a
very interesting case study. Having a centralized monetary policy, makes the macroprudential policy a
way to act independently as a partial substitute for the lack of national monetary policies.7 However, our
study makes the two policies working in a context of a monetary union with transmissions and relative
obligations, looking at both the whole euro area and Lithuanian perspectives.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the interaction between monetary policy and macropru-
dential policy. This has been recently covered by Carrillo et al. (2016), in the context of a so-called
"Tinbergen principle," by looking at whether the monetary policy rule should be expanded to introduce
nancial stability considerations, or there should be instead a separate nancial policy rule. Indeed,
their main point is if having two policy targets (price and nancial stability) would indeed require two
instruments or we can actually apply a one-rule regime with a monetary policy rule, based on both
ination and nancial conditions (expected credit spreads, in their case).8 The authorsndings favor
separate but well-coordinated monetary and nancial policies. Moreover, the dual regime is signicantly
superior in terms of welfare gains.
Several other papers address the issue of whether central banks should react to nancial stability
conditions, or a separate nancial authority at the national level is preferred. And the conclusions in the
literature are rather di¤erent. They go from simply concluding that monetary policy authorities should
7See also Quint and Rabanal (2014).
8The "Tinbergen principle" argues that there should be two di¤erent instruments when there are two di¤erent policy
goals.
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react to nancial stability issues when macroprudential policies fail as an instrument of last resort9, while
still keeping the authorities separated (Smets, 2014)10, to proposing a modied Taylor rule to include,
for instance, a natural rate of interest (Taylor and Wieland, 2016)11, or an explicit nancial variable
(as house prices in Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2015). Svensson (2015) and Yellen (2014) instead, are
in favor of having a fully separated di¤erent authorities for the two objectives: one to address nancial
and macroprudential issues and a central bank focusing on price stability. Especially, Svensson (2015),
points out that macroprudential policy cannot achieve price stability and monetary policy, from its side,
is not able to guarantee nancial stability, not ensuring that there are su¢ cient capital and liquidity
bu¤ers in the nancial system. The author also stresses that the two policies indeed interact and only
indirectly, for instance, monetary policy may inuence nancial stability via e¤ects on lending and
credit; or macroprudential policy can have an impact on ination. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2015)
also consider this topic however, they do it in a closed economy setting. They conclude that welfare gains
are maximized when the central bank aims at stabilizing ination, responding only to prices and output,
and the macroprudential regulator cares about nancial stability. Lastly, Quint and Rabanal (2014),
also study the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated two-country model
of the euro area,12 representing core and periphery.13 They conclude that extending a monetary policy
rule to react to credit aggregates improves welfare with respect to the original one, with borrowers being
worse o¤ under some conditions. Introducing a macroprudential instrument, further increases welfare
but still with a trade-o¤ between borrowers and savers.
3 Model Setup
We consider an innite-horizon, two-country economy inside a monetary union. The home country is
denoted by LIT and the rest of the union by EUR. Households consume, work, and demand real estate.
There is a nancial intermediary in each country that provides mortgages and accepts deposits from
9Smets (2014) suggests to allow the central bank to "lean against the wind" in case of nancial stability troubles only
if necessary, while maintaining its primary focus on price stability in the medium term.
10Smets (2014) also stresses the possible risks of having macroprudential actions delivered by a central bank. First, there
is a risk that the reputation of the central bank is damaged, which may a¤ect its overall independence and credibility.
Second, it may give rise to time inconsistency problems and may lead to so-called "nancial dominance."
11As recently stressed by Pedersen (2015), having a low natural real rate may drive an increase in risk taking and thus
in the likelihood of asset price bubbles. This can have implications for nancial stability.
12This paper seems to be the closest to our approach, by also applying the framework by Rubio (2013), and adding
borrowing constraint á la Iacoviello (2005) with no default. The authors however estimate and not calibrate the model.
13 In Quint and Rabanal (2014), the two regions of the euro area, i.e.core and periphery, are obtained by aggregating data
for France and Germany for the rst group and Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain for the periphery.
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consumers.14 Each country produces one di¤erentiated intermediate good, but households consume
goods from both countries. For simplicity, housing is a non-traded good. We assume that labor is
immobile across the countries.15 Firms follow a standard Calvo problem (after Calvo, 1983). In this
economy, both nal and intermediate goods are produced. Prices are sticky in the intermediate-goods
sector. Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank that responds to a weighted average of
ination in both countries. Analogous to the setting of the interest rate, there is a rule for the setting of
the LTV, which serves as a macroprudential measure. We allow for housing-market heterogeneity across
the countries.
3.1 The Consumers Problem
There are three types of consumers in each country: unconstrained consumers, constrained consumers
who borrow at a variable rate, and constrained consumers who borrow at a xed rate. The proportion of
each type of borrower is xed and exogenous.16 Consumers can be constrained or unconstrained in the
sense that constrained individuals need to collateralize their debt repayments in order to borrow from
the nancial intermediary. Interest payments in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the future
value of the current house stock. In this way, the nancial intermediary ensures that borrowers are going
to be able to fulll their debt obligations in the next period. As in Iacoviello (2005), We assume that
constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones.17 There is a nancial intermediary
in each country. The nancial intermediary in each country accepts deposits from domestic savers, and
it extends both xed- and variable-rate loans to domestic borrowers.
14We are aware that there are two possible presentations of banks in a DSGE model: nancial intermediary approach
and money creator approach. However, in order to make the model comparable with the standard literature, we prefer
to stick to the more commonly used approach. In this way, our results can be related to other papers that introduce
macroprudential rules in a DSGE framework such as Kannan et al. (2012) or Angelini et al. (2014). Our decision is thus
practical, rather than theoretical or technical.
15This is a standard simplifying assumption, since the focus of the paper is on nancial markets. We aknowledge the
fact that labor mobility has been a factor within the euro area, however is not covered here. This is especially true for
Lithuania. This resulted in labor shortage in the country and a signicant emigration.
16According to the European Mortgage Federation, the type of mortgage contracts across countries responds to a large
extent to institutional or cultural factors, which are out of the scope of the present model. In the short run, the proportion
of each type of mortgage contract can uctuate, but, typically, it does not imply a change in the xed- or variable-rate
category of the country.
17This assumption ensures that the borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state and that the economy is endoge-
nously split into borrowers and savers.
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3.1.1 Unconstrained Consumers (Savers)
Unconstrained consumers in LIT maximize as follows:
max E0
1X
t=0
t

lnCut + j lnH
u
t  
(Lut )



; (1)
Here, E0 is the expectation operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor for savers, and Cut , Hut , and Lut
are consumption at t, the stock of housing, and hours worked, respectively. j represents the weight of
housing in the utility function. 1= (   1) is the aggregate labor-supply elasticity.
Consumption is a bundle of domestically and foreign-produced goods, dened as: Cut = (C
u
LIT t)
n (CuEURt)
1 n ;
where n is the size of LIT.
The budget constraint for LIT is as follows:
PLITtC
u
LIT t + PEURtC
u
EURt +QLITtH
u
t +RLITt 1B
u
t 1 +Rt 1Dt 1 +
 
2
D2t  QtHut 1+
W ut L
u
t +B
u
t +Dt + PLITtFt + PLITtSt; (2)
where PLITt and PEURt are the prices of the goods produced in Countries LIT and EUR, respectively, Qt
is the housing price in LIT, Hut is the stock of housing and W
u
t is the wage for unconstrained consumers.
But represents domestic bonds denominated in the common currency. RLITt is the nominal interest rate
in LIT. Positive bond holdings signify borrowing, and negative signify savings. However, as we will
see, this group will choose not to borrow at all: they are the savers in this economy. Dt are foreign-
bond holdings by savers in LIT, who have indeed access to the international nancial market. Rt is
the nominal rate of foreign bonds, which are denominated in euros. As is common in the literature,
to ensure stationarity of net foreign assets we introduced a small quadratic cost of deviating from zero
foreign borrowing,  2D
2
t . Savers obtain interest on their savings. St and Ft are lump-sum prots received
from the rms and the nancial intermediary in LIT, respectively.
Dividing by PLITt, we can rewrite the budget constraint in terms of goods LIT18:
18The variables in small letters are taken divided by PLITt:
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CuLIT t+
PEURt
PLITt
CuEURt+qLITtH
u
t +
RLITt 1but 1
LITt
+
Rt 1dt 1
LITt
+
 
2
d2t  qLITtHut 1+wut Lut +but +dt+Ft+St;
(3)
where LITt denotes ination for the goods produced in LIT, dened as PLITt=PLITt 1:
Maximizing (1) subject to (3) ; we obtain the rst-order conditions for the unconstrained group:
CuLIT t
CuEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PLITt (4)
1
CuLIT t
= Et

RLITt
LITt+1CuLIT t+1

; (5)
1   dt
CuLIT t
= Et

Rt
LITt+1CuLIT t+1

; (6)
wut = (L
u
t )
 1 CuLIT t
n
; (7)
j
Hut
=
n
CuLIT t
qLITt   Et n
CuLIT t+1
qLITt+1: (8)
Equation (4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between goods to the relative price. Equation (5)
is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (6) is the rst-order condition for net foreign assets.
Equation (7) is the labor-supply condition. These equations are standard. Equation (8) is the Euler
equation for housing and states that at the margin the benets from consuming housing have to be equal
to the costs.
Combining (5) and (6) we obtain a non-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds:19
RLITt =
Rt
(1   dt) : (9)
Since all consumption goods are traded and there are no barriers to trade, we assume in this paper
that the law of one price holds:
19The log-linearized version of this equation could be interpreted as the uncovered interest-rate parity.
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PLITt = P

LITt; (10)
where variables with a star denote foreign variables and P LITt is the foreign price of goods produced at
home.
3.1.2 Constrained Consumers (Borrowers)
Constrained consumers in LIT are of two types: those who borrow at a variable rate and those who
do so at a xed rate. The di¤erence between them is the interest rate they are charged. The variable-
rate constrained consumer faces RLITt, which will coincide with the rate set by the central bank. The
xed-rate borrower pays RLITt, derived from the nancial intermediarys problem. The proportion of
variable-rate consumers in LIT is constant and exogenous and is equal to LIT 2 [0; 1].
Constrained consumers are more impatient than unconstrained ones, that is e <  in terms of
discount factors for borrowers and savers respectively. Constrained consumers face a collateral con-
straint: the expected debt repayment in the next period cannot exceed a proportion of the expectation
of tomorrows value of todays stock of housing:
Et
RLITt
LITt+1
bcvt  kLITtEtqLITt+1Hcvt ; (11)
Et
RLITt
LITt+1
bcft  kLITtEtqLITt+1Hcft ; (12)
where equations (11) and (12) represent the collateral constraint for the variable- and xed-rate borrower,
respectively. kLITt can be interpreted as the loan-to-value ratio in LIT. Notice that such models with
collateral constraints, the LTV is typically considered exogenous. At the macroeconomic level, LTVs
partly depend on exogenous factors such as regulation. This parameter is usually calibrated to match
the average (market) LTV in the country analyzed.20 However, in this model, it can vary depending
on economic conditions, as a macroprudential policy variable.21 For the setting of the xed interest
rate, RLITt, we follow Rubio (2011). We assume that there is a nancial intermediary in each country
20Due to data availability, we use the average new loansLTV at origination.
21 It has to be taking into account that in reality, macroprudential LTV caps are not always binding. Even a stable LTV
cap inherently has a countercyclical e¤ect as it is less binding after a crisis but is likely to become more binding as credit
and housing prices pick up during the nancial cycle (Matk·enait·e et al., 2016).
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that accepts deposits from savers and extends both xed and variable-rate mortgages to borrowers. For
the two types of mortgage to be o¤ered, the xed-interest rate has to be such that the intermediary
is indi¤erent between lending at a variable or xed rate. RLITt will be an aggregate interest rate that
contains information on all the past xed-interest rates associated with past debt. Each period, this
aggregate interest rate is updated with a new xed interest rate that is an average discount average of
all future variable interest rates.
Without loss of generality, we present the problem for the variable-rate borrower since for the xed
rate it is symmetrical. Variable-rate borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
max E0
1X
t=0
etlnCcvt + j lnHcvt   (Lcvt )

; (13)
where Ccvt = (C
cv
LIT t)
n (CcvEURt)
1 n ; subject to the budget constraint (in terms of good LIT):
CcvLIT t +
PEURt
PLITt
CcvEURt + qLITtH
cv
t +
RLITt 1bcvt 1
LITt
 qLITtHcvt 1 + wcvt Lcvt + bcvt ; (14)
and subject to the collateral constraint (11). Notice that variable-rate borrowers repay all debt every
period and acquire new debt at the current new interest rate. This assumption implies that the interest
rate on variable-rate mortgages is revised every period for the whole stock of debt and changed according
to the policy rate.22 To make the problem for xed-rate borrowers symmetrical and analogous to
existing models with borrowing constraints, we assume the same debt-repayment structure for this type
of borrower. Obviously, xed-rate contracts are not revised every period. However, to make the model
more realistic, but still tractable, the xed-interest rate will be such that a revised xed rate will be
applied only on new debt, keeping constant the interest rate applied to existing debt. In this way, we
reconcile the structure of the model with the fact that xed-rate contracts are long term.
The rst-order conditions for these consumers are as follows:
CcvLIT t
CcvEURt
=
nPEURt
(1  n)PLITt (15)
n
CcvLIT t
= eEt nRLITt
LITt+1CcvLIT t+1

+ cvt RLITt; (16)
22This assumption is consistent with reality, in which variable-interest rates are revised very frequently and changed
according to an interest-rate index tied to the interest rate set by the central bank.
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wcvt = (L
cv
t )
 1 CcvLIT t
n
; (17)
j
Hcvt
=
n
CcvLIT t
qLITt   eEt n
CcvLIT t+1
qLITt+1   cvt kLITtEtqLITt+1LITt+1: (18)
These rst-order conditions di¤er from those of unconstrained individuals. In the case of constrained
consumers, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (cvt ) appears in equations (16) and
(18). As in Iacoviello (2005), the borrowing constraint is always binding, so that constrained individuals
borrow the maximum amount they are allowed, and their saving is zero. The problem for consumers is
analogous in country EUR.
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Final-Goods Producers
In LIT, there is a continuum of nal-goods producers that aggregate intermediate goods according to
the production function:
Y kLIT t =
Z 1
0
Y kLIT t (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (19)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
The total demand of intermediate-good z is given by YLITt (z) =

PLITt(z)
PLITt
 "
YLITt; and the price
index is PLITt =
hR 1
0 PLITt (z)
1 " dz
i 1
" 1
:
3.2.2 Intermediate-Goods Producers
The intermediate-goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermedi-
ate goods are produced according to the following production function:
YLITt (z) = t (L
u
t (z))
LIT (Lct (z))
(1 LIT ) ; (20)
where t represents technology. We assume that log t =  log t 1 + ut, where  is the autoregressive
coe¢ cient and ut is a normally distributed shock to technology. LIT 2 [0; 1] measures the relative size
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of each group in terms of labor23. Lct is labor supplied by constrained consumers, dened as LITL
cv
t +
(1  LIT )Lcft .
The rst-order conditions for labor demand are the following:24
wut =
1
Xt
LIT
YLITt
Lut
; (21)
wcvt = w
cf
t =
1
Xt
(1  LIT ) YLITt
Lct
; (22)
where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.
The price-setting problem for the intermediate-goods producers is a standard Calvo-Yun case. An
intermediate-goods producer sells goods at price PLITt (z) ; and 1   is the probability of being able to
change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price POPTLIT t (z) solves the following:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

POPTLIT t (z)
PLITt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y OPTLIT t+k (z)

= 0: (23)
The aggregate price level is given as follows:
PLITt =
h
P 1 "LIT t 1 + (1  )
 
POPTLIT t
1 "i1=(1 ")
: (24)
Using (23) and (24) and log-linearizing, we can obtain the standard forward-looking Phillips curve25.
The rm problem is similar in EUR.
3.3 Aggregate Variables and Market Clearing
Given LIT ; the fraction of variable-rate borrowers in LIT, we can dene aggregates across constrained
consumers as the sum of variable-rate and xed-rate aggregates, so that Cct  LITCcvt +(1  LIT )Ccft ;
Hct  LITHcvt + (1  LIT )Hcft and bct  LIT bcvt + (1  LIT ) bcft :
Therefore, economy-wide aggregates in LIT are Ct  Cut + Cct , Lt  Lut + Lct . The aggregate supply
of housing is xed, so that market clearing requires Ht  Hut +Hct = H.26
23 It can be seen as labor-income share and proxy for the di¤erences in debt to GDP.
24Symmetry across rms allows avoiding index z:
25The Phillips curve is as the following: ^LITt = ^LITt+1   ekx^t + uLITt,where x^ is 1/real marginal cost and ek =
[(1  )(1  )=]:
26An endogenous supply of housing could be easily introduced in a two-sector version of this model. However, the
qualitative results would not change for the demand side of the model which is the focus of this paper. For two-sector
models, see, for example, Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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The market clearing condition for the nal good in LIT is nYLITt = nCLITt + (1  n)CLITt +
n 2 d
2
t . Domestic nancial markets clear: b
c
t = b
u
t : The world bond market clearing condition is ndt +
(1  n) PEURtPLITt dt = 0; where dt denotes the foreign bonds in real terms. The net foreign asset position
follows dt =
Rt 1
(1  dt)LITtdt 1 + YLITt   CLITt  
PEURt
PLITt
CEURt. Everything is similar in EUR.
3.4 Monetary Policy
3.4.1 Taylor Rule
The model closes with a Taylor rule, with interest-rate smoothing for interest-rate setting by a single
central bank,27
Rt = (Rt 1)
h
(LITt)
n (EURt)
(1 n)
i(1+)
R
1 
"R;t; (25)
0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia. (1 + ) measures the sensitivity of
interest rates to current ination. "R;t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and variance 2" . R
is the interest rate in steady state. This rule is consistent with the primary objective of the ECB being
price stability.
3.4.2 Extended Taylor Rule
As part of the discussion, we also consider an extended Taylor rule in which the central bank takes
care of both macroeconomic and nancial stability. It is extended in the sense that the interest rate
setting also takes into account credit variables. The framework is analogous to the simple Taylor rule
in the sense that the response of the interest rate to credit will take into account this variable in all the
countries of the union, appropriately weighted by their country size.
Rt = (Rt 1)
0@h(LITt)n (EURt)(1 n)i(1+) "bLITt
bLIT
nbEURt
bEUR
(1 n)#b
R
1A1  "R;t; (26)
27This type of rule is also used in other monetary-union models. See Iacoviello and Smets (2006) or Aspachs and Rabanal
(2008). Furthermore, as shown in Iacoviello (2005) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2013), a rule that only responds to
ination enhances the nancial accelerator.
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3.5 LTV Policy
As an approximation for the way macroprudential policy works in the euro area, we consider a rule for the
LTV.28 In standard models, the LTV is a xed parameter which is not a¤ected by economic conditions.
However, we can think of regulations of LTVs as a way to moderate credit booms. When the LTV (cap)
is high, the collateral constraint is less tight. And, since the constraint here is binding, borrowers will
borrow as much as they are allowed to. Lowering the LTV tightens the constraint and therefore restricts
the loans that borrowers can obtain. Recent research on macroprudential policies has proposed simple
rules for the LTV so that it reacts inversely to variables such that the growth rates of GDP, credit, the
credit-to-GDP ratio or house prices.29 We decided to make the rule more parsimonious allowing the
LTV to react to borrowing. This will help for a further study on the interactions with monetary policy.
Here, we assume that there exists a macroprudential Taylor-type rule for the LTV, so that it responds
to deviations of credit from its steady state.30 We consider a decentralized macroprudential policy in
which each country can implement its own rule:
kLITt = kSSLIT

bLITt
bLIT
 LITb
; (27)
kEURt = kSSEUR

bEURt
bEUR
 EURb
: (28)
where kSSLIT ; bLIT are the steady-state values for the loan-to-value ratio and borrowing in LIT. LITb ; 
EUR
b 
0 measure the response of the loan-to-value to deviations of borrowing from its steady state in Lithuania
and the rest of the euro area, respectively. This kind of rule would be countercyclical, delivering a lower
LTV in credit booms, therefore restricting the credit in the economy.
28The literature has shown that restricting credit from the demand side (LTV) or the supply side (Capital requirements,
CRR) show similar results on the macroeconomy (See for instance Angelini et al., 2014). Therefore, we expect the conclusions
of the paper to hold. We prefer to use the LTV limit because it is not controled by Basel regulations as the CRR and
countries have more freedom to set it.
29With a macroprudential orientation, Kannan et al., (2012) also examine a monetary policy rule that reacts to prices,
output and changes in collateral values with a macroprudential instrument based on the LTV; Funke and Paetz (2012)
consider a non-linear version of a macroprudential rule for the LTV.
30We have also experimented with rules that react to output and house prices and results for the dynamics of the model
are similar. The rst variable would correspond to the objective of the macroprudential regulator to moderate booms in
the economy that could lead to an excessive credit growth. Drehmann et al. (2010) also point out that the deviations
of credit from its long-term trend are very good indicators of the increase in systemic risk, which is the macroprudential
attention. As for the house prices, given collateral constraints, they are the key causal variable for the dynamics of loans
to households, and it appears to correspond to the actual behavior of policymakers (Angelini et al., 2012).
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3.6 Welfare Measure
In order to provide a measure for welfare, we numerically evaluate how cross-country asymmetries a¤ect
welfare for a given policy rule and for technology shocks. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2012),
the two approaches that have recently been used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either
characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to
the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. As in Mendicino
and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be able to evaluate the welfare of the three types
of agents separately.31 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers in LIT is dened, respectively,
as follows:
Vu;t  Et
1X
m=0
m
 
lnCut+m + j lnH
u
t+m  
 
Lut+m


!
; (29)
Vcv;t  Et
1X
m=0
em lnCcvt+m + j lnHcvt+m    Lcvt+m
!
; (30)
Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we dene social welfare in LIT as a weighted sum of the
individual welfare for the di¤erent types of households:
Vt = (1  )Vu;t +

1  e [AVcv;t + (1  A)Vcf;t] : (31)
Borrowers and saverswelfare are weighted by

1  e and (1  ) ; respectively, so that the two groups
receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream. Everything is symmetrical for
EUR.
Total welfare is dened as a weighted sum of the welfare in the two countries:
Wt = nVt + (1  n)V t : (32)
In order to make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption
equivalents. We use as a benchmark the welfare evaluated when the macroprudential policy is not active
31We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order
approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous
consumers.
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and compare it with the welfare obtained when such policy is implemented.32
4 Parameter Values
Parameters are calibrated to reect the economy of Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. Some of
the parameters are standard and are common for both economies and some others will be specically
calibrated for each country. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values.
Discount factors are set to be common in both economies, following the standard values in the
literature. The discount factor for savers, , is set to 0:99.33 The discount factor for borrowers, e, is set
to 0:98.34 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function, j, is set to 0:12 and 0:14, in the
euro area and Lithuania, respectively. This parameter pins down the ratio of housing wealth to GDP,
since the latter in the steady state is a function of this parameter.35 We set  = 2, implying a value of
the labor supply elasticity of 1:36 For the LTV we consider a steady-state value of 0.68 and 0.78, for the
euro area and Lithuania, respectively, taking the LTV observed in the data.37 The labor-income share
of unconstrained consumers, , is set to 0:7.38 We pick a value of 6 for ", the elasticity of substitution
among intermediate goods. This value implies a steady-state markup of 1:2. The probability of not
changing prices, , is set to 0:75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. For
the Taylor rule parameters, we used  = 0:8,  = 0:5: The rst value reects a realistic degree of
interest-rate smoothing.39  is consistent with the original parameters proposed by Taylor in 1993.
We consider , the proportion of variable-rate mortgages, to be 0.45 and 0.82, in the euro area and
Lithuania, respectively. The size of Lithuania is considered to be 0.35%.40 A technology shock was a 1
per cent positive technology with 0.9 persistence.41 For simulations, we set LITb = 
EUR
b = b = 0:05.
32We follow Ascari and Ropele (2009).
33Since the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982), the literature on DSGE models considers a calibrated value
of the discount factor of 0.99 as the standard value for this parameter.
34Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0:95 and 0:98 at quarterly frequency.
35Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we use 1.2, value that reects the ratio of housing wealth to GDP across most
industrialized countries as a proxy for the euro area. This ratio is higher though in Lithuania.
36Microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of 0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) showed
that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimate could have a downward bias of 50 per cent.
37Note that the macroprudential LTV cap in Lithuania since 2011 is 85 per cent, which is higher than the average LTV
in the last decade.
38This value is in the range of the estimates of Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the US, and Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) for the US, Canada, France, and Sweden. Therefore, we take it as valid for most of the countries of the
euro area.
39See McCallum (2001).
40Even though Lithuania is such a small country, we still want to keep a two-country setting to be able to study the
interaction between policies in Lithuania and the rest of the euro area and potentially centralized vs. decentralized policies.
41This high persistence value for technology shocks is consistent with what is commonly reported in the literature. Smets
and Wouters (2002) estimated a value of 0.822 for this parameter in Europe; Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated it as 0.93
18
We set this number arbitrarily to a low value to give a sense of how the macroprudential rule works.
Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of the parameter values.42
Table 1: Country-specic parameter values
EUR LIT
j 0:12 0:14 Weight of housing in utility function
k 0:68 0:78 Average loan-to-value ratio
 0:45 0:82 Degree of variability of interest rate
n 0:9965 0:0035 Country size
Table 2: Common parameter Values
 :99 Discount factor for saverse :98 Discount factor for borrowers
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
 :70 Labor-Income share for savers
" 6 Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
 0:8 Interest-rate smoothing in Taylor rule
 :5 Ination parameter in Taylor rule
b :05 Credit parameter in Taylor rule
LITb :05 Credit parameter in LTV rule, Lithuania
EURb :05 Credit parameter in LTV rule, euro area
 0:9 Technology shock persistence
5 Shock Transmission
In this section, we study the dynamics of the model by showing impulse-responses to a monetary policy
shock, a technology shock and a house price shock, when there are and there are not macroprudential
policies, using the parameter values shown in Table 2. As in the previous section, we consider two types
of macroprudential policies: an extended Taylor rule in which the central bank takes care of nancial
stability vs. a rule for the LTV, in which each authority has separate objectives (TR+LTV Rule).
for the US.
42For Lithuania, the average LTV, the percentage of variable/xed rates, as well as housing wealth/GDP (used to calculate
the weight of housing in the utility function) are based on data up to 2014 and averaged over the period 2005-2014. Hence,
the calibrated parameters refer to the mortgage conditions in the country over the crisis/post-crisis period.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy shock. Benchmark, Extended Taylor rule and LTV
rule.
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Figure 2: LTV Response to a Monetary Policy Shock. TR+LTV Rule.
5.1 Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. This represents a decrease in the
interest rate by the ECB, in order to reect an expansionary shock that increases risk in the economy
and gives rise to macroprudential policies. As it is an expansionary common shock, borrowing in both
Lithuania and the rest of the euro area increase. This is due to lower cost of borrowing. However, the
increase in borrowing is stronger in Lithuania, given the nature of its mortgage rate. Variable rates in
Lithuania make that the pass-through of the policy rate to the actual borrowing rate is stronger and
thus the increase in borrowing is higher than for its partners. Given wealth e¤ects and the increase in
borrowing, consumption in both countries also goes up. The hike of credit gives rise to the activation of
20
macroprudential policies. Both the extended Taylor rule and the LTV rule respond countercyclically to
credit growth and therefore cut it, each one with its own instrument. Figure 2 shows how, for the case
in which the LTV rule is active, the LTV decreases both in Lithuania and in the rest of the euro area.
We see that for this shock, the LTV rule is the most e¤ective one in order to reduce credit. A decrease
of the LTV would partially o¤set the e¤ects of the expansionary monetary policy shock. As a result, the
impact of the shock on consumption would be mitigated, in a stronger way for the case of the LTV rule.
5.2 Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock
Figure 3 presents impulse responses to a technology shock in both countries. This is also by nature
an expansionary shock and makes credit increase. Furthermore, as a reaction, the ECB policy rate
goes down and this boosts credit even more. As in the previous case, variable rates in Lithuania make
borrowing increase by more in this country than in the rest of the euro area. Thus, this shock also
calls for macroprudential policies to be in place and soften the credit expansion (Figure 4 displays the
decrease in the LTV in both countries). When macroprudential policies are activated, borrowing does
not increase as much as in the benchmark case. We also see that, given that both macroprudential
rules are countercyclical, the real economy gets also a¤ected and the increase in consumption in both
countries is also mitigated. However, we see that for the case of this shock, the extended Taylor rule
reduces credit in a more substantial way than the LTV rule.
5.3 Impulse Responses to a House Price Shock
Figure 5 describes impulse responses to a house price shock both in Lithuania and in the rest of the
euro area.43 We see from the gure that the house price shock has stronger e¤ects in Lithuania and this
causes credit to increase by more in this country. This creates strong e¤ects on mortgaged houses and
on consumption. In the rest of the euro area, the e¤ects are similar but weaker, are more concentrated
in the housing market, producing a slight decrease in consumption. Macroprudential policies act coun-
tercyclically and soften the increase in credit in both countries (See gure 6). In this case, the extended
Taylor rule reduces credit by more in the rest on the euro area while the LTV rule is more e¤ective in
Lithuania.
43House prices are driven by housing demand. Therefore, housing demand shocks can also be interpreted as house price
shocks.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Technology shock. Benchmark, Extended Taylor rule and LTV rule.
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Figure 4: LTV Response to a Technology Shock. TR+LTV Rule.
6 Financial and Macroeconomic Stability
In this section, we study the implications of each setting (Taylor rule, extended Taylor rule and Taylor
and LTV rule) for nancial and macroeconomic stability. We approximate nancial stability by the
standard deviation of credit. Macroeconomic stability corresponds to the standard deviation of ination
and output. Here we try to assess the implication of having monetary policy with the interest rate in
charge of nancial stability as opposed to a di¤erent instrument, namely the LTV, taking care of this
goal and leaving monetary policy with the single objective of price stability.
Svensson (2012) argues that conducting monetary policy and nancial-stability policy in an integrated
way may be inappropriate, since monetary policy and nancial-stability policy are distinct and separate
policies with di¤erent objectives and di¤erent instruments. Tinbergen (1952) put forth what we now
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a House Price shock. Benchmark, Extended Taylor rule and LTV rule.
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Figure 6: LTV Response to a House Price Shock. TR+LTV Rule.
call the Tinbergen principle, that policymakers need at least one independent policy instrument for
each policy objective. Since the policy interest rate is used by monetary policymakers to achieve the
objective of price stability, at least one other instrument is required to achieve the additional objective
of nancial stability of macroprudential policy. Svensson (2012) suggests that monetary policy should
be in charge of price stability while macroprudential policy needs to address nancial stability. We try
to shed some light to the debate with our results.44
44The macroprudential authority is assumed to be time-consistent and "hawkish", which does not have to be the case in
practice (for example, the institutional set-up ensuring the independence of the authority could play a role). Subsequently,
if the macroprudential policy rule were di¤erent, the results might not be so clear-cut.
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Table 3: Macroeconomic and Financial volatilities
Lithuania Euro
 y b  y b
Taylor Rule 0.2286 1.9984 3.2399 0.2253 1.9959 2.8351
Extended Taylor Rule 0.3811 1.9294 2.0391 0.3757 1.9117 1.9970
TR+LTV Rule 0.2299 1.9965 2.8115 0.2264 1.9944 2.5450
Table 3 presents the macroeconomic and nancial volatilities for each macroprudential policy set-
ting.45 We can interpret the rst row of the table as a benchmark in which monetary policy responds to
ination and there are no macroprudential policies in place. This would be the pre-crisis policy setting.
The second row illustrates equation (26), in which the Taylor rule is extended to include credit variables
and take care of nancial stability in addition to price stability. Finally, the third row could correspond
to a situation in which the central banks objective is the union price stability while there are national
macroprudential authorities that maintain nancial stability.
We see that, initially, without macroprudential policies, the nancial scenario in Lithuania is more
unstable than in the rest of the euro area. Variable-rate mortgages, high LTVs and di¤erent housing
characteristics make borrowing more volatile in this country. When macroprudential policies are in-
troduced, we see that the volatility of credit decreases in all cases. Including credit variables in the
Taylor rule is also very e¤ective for nancial stability purposes. However, it clearly comes at the cost of
increasing macroeconomic instability, especially coming from ination. Having the central bank taking
care of both objectives at the same time creates conicts in reaching both at the same time. When there
is a separate macroprudential authority taking care of nancial stability, the central bank can do its job
and macroeconomic stability is not in danger. With respect to the benchmark case, the volatility of
borrowing is reduced, although not as much as with an extended Taylor rule.
As a complement to Table 3, Table 4 presents welfare results:
45We use the Dynare toolkit to simulate our model. Using this package, we can calculate both theoretical moments and
simulated moments. For linearized models, both approaches deliver very close results.
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Table 4: Welfare Gains
Lithuania Euro
Extended Taylor Rule Savers -0.010 -0.099
Borrowers 11.372 13.364
Total 0.0065 0.0089
TR+LTV Rule Savers -0.0015 -0.0015
Borrowers 0.0435 0.0821
Total 0.0211 0.0536
Consistently with Table 3, we can observe that having the two authorities taking care of di¤erent
objectives is more benecial for the whole economy, since welfare gains are larger in this case, in line
with Carrillo et al. (2016). We also observe that borrowers prefer the extended Taylor rule because it
is more e¤ective in terms of achieving nancial stability. However, this comes at the expense of higher
welfare losses for savers because macroeconomic stability is compromised.
In order to convey our results and as a robustness check, we present the volatilities implied by both
macroprudential policies for di¤erent values of the credit reaction parameter b in both the extended
Taylor rule and the LTV rule.
Figure 7 presents the volatility of credit implied by increasing the aggressiveness of macroprudential
policies. We take the volatility of credit as an indicator of nancial stability, in the sense that if it
gets lower, it means that the nancial system is more stable. We check how the volatility of credit
changes when we increase the credit reaction parameter for both the extended Taylor rule and the LTV
rule. We nd that in Lithuania, the starting point with respect to the volatility of credit is higher than
in the rest of the euro area, because of the above mentioned special characteristics of this economy
with respect to its European partners, that make the nancial system of this country more sensitive to
shocks. The gure shows that both rules are e¤ective in terms of reducing the volatility of borrowing
and therefore in bringing a more stable nancial system, the goal of macroprudential policies. However,
the macroprudential Taylor rule seems to be more e¤ective for this purpose in both countries, at least
for the range of parameters that we are considering. Nevertheless, gure 7 only considers the nancial
stability, the objective of macroprudential policy, and does not consider macroeconomic stability.
Figures 8 and 9 display the macroeconomic and nancial stability trade-o¤s implied by each macro-
prudential policy, in conjunction with monetary policy. Figure 8 shows the volatility of ination, output
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Figure 7: Financial stability implied by increasing the credit reaction parameter (Macroprudential TR
vs. LTV rule)
and credit for the extended Taylor rule for monetary policy. We can actually see that even though this
rule is very e¤ective in reducing the volatility of credit, it comes with a cost in terms of ination. The
volatility of output slightly improves with the aggressiveness of the rule with respect to credit, but the
ination one worsens. Therefore, when using the interest rate as the only instrument both for monetary
and macroprudential policy, there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the nancial system and keeping
prices stable, which should be the primary goal of monetary policy. Monetary and macroprudential
policy objectives enter in conict if there is just one instrument for two goals.
On the contrary, gure 9 displays the volatilities implied by increasing the aggressiveness of the LTV
rule. We can see that in this case, although not as e¤ective as the previous case, this rule manages to
achieve the goal of increasing nancial stability without compromising the objectives of monetary policy.
This reinforces the "Tinbergen principle" which argues that there should be two di¤erent instruments
when there are two di¤erent policy goals.46
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a two-country DSGE model with housing to study the implications of macro-
prudential policies in both Lithuania and the rest of the euro area, given the recent entrance of Lithuania
46This result is in line with Quint and Rabanal (2014), which studied core and periphery countries in the euro area.
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Figure 8: Volatilities implied by increasing the credit reaction parameter in the Macroprudential Taylor
rule.
in the euro area. One of the countries is calibrated to reect the Lithuanian economy, while the other one
represents the rest of the euro area. We consider two di¤erent ways of implementing macroprudential
policies. In the rst one, the ECB extends its goals to also include nancial stability. In this case, with
just one instrument, namely the interest rate, the central bank takes care of two objectives: price and
nancial stability. In the second policy scenario, the central bank focuses on price stability having the
interest rate as an instrument while a separate macroprudential authority uses an LTV rule to pursue
nancial stability. First, we illustrate the dynamics of the model for both rules by showing impulse
responses to a monetary policy shock, a technology shock and a house price shock. Results show that in
Lithuania, shocks are transmitted in a stronger way given variable rates in this country, higher mortgage
debt and LTVs. However, macroprudential policies are indeed successful at mitigating the e¤ects on
shocks on credit growth. Then, we study the implications of both policy scenarios for macroeconomic
and nancial stability. We nd that both rules are e¤ective in terms of reducing the volatility of bor-
rowing and therefore in bringing a more stable nancial system, the goal of macroprudential policies.
However, the macroprudential Taylor rule seems to be more e¤ective for this purpose in both countries.
Nevertheless, even though this rule is very e¤ective in reducing the volatility of credit, it comes with
a cost in terms of ination volatility. When using the interest rate as the only instrument both for
monetary and macroprudential policy, there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the nancial system and
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Figure 9: Volatilities implied by increasing the credit reaction parameter in the LTV rule.
keeping prices stable, which should be the primary goal of monetary policy. The LTV rule, although
not as e¤ective as the extended Taylor rule, manages to achieve the goal of increasing nancial stability
without compromising the objectives of monetary policy, which it is still the goal of a standard Taylor
Rule. Welfare results are consistent with these ndings.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Housing and mortgage markets in the EA19
Average LTV Max LTV Rates HH debt/GDP NFCs debt/GDP
AT 65 V 52 126
BE 83 100 F 59 166
CY 80 75 V 142 354
DE 67 80 F 54 99
EE 71 87.5 V 42 117
ES 70 100 V 72 154
FI 75 80 V 71 156
FR 67 100 F 65 144
GR 73 V 69 126
IE 66 85 F 62 303
IT 55 80 F 47 117
LT 78 85 V 34 55
LU 87 F 58 343
LV 95 95 V 26 89
MT 63 70 V 66 132
NL 90 102 F 122 229
PT 83 90 V 80 182
SI 65 V 31 87
SK 70 95 F 37 81
Note: The data are taken from ECB (2016, 2009), Huber (2016) and IMF (2008, 2011). They are
integrated with information coming from national sources in the case of Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia,
Greece and Hungary. For the rates, the data concern new loans and are from ECB SDW (data up to
2016). For the rates, V means that the majority of loans are at variable rates while F stands for xed.
The data on household (HH) or NFCs debt/GDP are from Eurostat and they are for 2015. The Max
LTV is the regulatory LTV if the value is in bold. These are averaged if concern di¤erent types of
loans.47
47We are very thankful to Lorenzo Isgrò for the data on the rates and to Dmitry Kulikov for the Estonian data. The
max LTV data in case of AT, GR, LU and SI are not available.
34
